By David Scheer and Joshua Gallu March 12 (Bloomberg) — Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. used off-balance-sheet transactions to downplay its leverage in late 2007 and 2008, deceiving shareholders about its ability to withstand losses, a bankruptcy examiner’s report said. Then-Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld was “at least grossly negligent” for letting Lehman file financial reports in which a key gauge of strength was “reverse-engineered” through transactions known as Repo 105s, bankruptcy examiner Anton Valukas said in a report yesterday. Lehman auditor Ernst & Young LLP could be accused of “professional malpractice,” he said. “The balance sheet manipulation was intentional, for deceptive appearances, had a material impact on Lehman’s net leverage ratio” and caused financial reports to be misleading, Valukas wrote of the New York-based company. Higher leverage undermines a firm’s capacity to absorb financial shock. Lehman filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008 after mounting losses on mortgage-backed securities spooked investors and creditors. The Wall Street investment bank’s failure helped trigger a freeze of global credit markets, forcing the U.S. government to provide $700 billion in bailout funds. Fuld didn’t know what the Repo 105 transactions were, his lawyer, Patricia Hynes of Allen & Overy LP in New York, said in a statement. He “didn’t structure or negotiate them,” she said. “Nor was he aware of the accounting treatment.” Concern Among Workers The transactions increased just before the end of financial reporting periods, temporarily moving $49 billion to $50 billion of assets off the balance sheet at the end of the first and second quarters of 2008, according to the report. Many employees expressed concern that Lehman was alone among its peers in using such methods, Valukas said. Ernst & Young last audited Lehman for the fiscal year ending Nov. 30, 2007, the accounting firm said in a statement yesterday. “Our opinion indicated that Lehman’s financial statements for that year were fairly presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,” the firm said. “We remain of that view.” The leverage ratios that were reported in Lehman’s management discussion and analysis “were the responsibility of management, not the auditor,” Ernst & Young said. “They are not part of the audited financial statements.” Valukas, appointed by a federal court in Manhattan last year to probe Lehman’s demise, doesn’t have prosecutorial authority. Instead, the report outlines what claims creditors may bring to recoup losses. Archstone-Smith Trust In its final year, Lehman also overvalued some real-estate holdings, including a stake in U.S. apartment developer Archstone-Smith Trust, Valukas said. Lehman and Tishman Speyer Properties LP completed a joint acquisition of Archstone for $22 billion, including debt, in October 2007. In the first three quarters of 2008, Lehman’s valuations for an equity holding in Archstone “were unreasonable,” the examiner wrote. In the second quarter of 2008, for example, the stake may have been overvalued by as much as $450 million. As Wall Street’s mortgage losses mounted in 2007, banks struggled to win back investor confidence. By at least January 2008, Fuld had become focused on net leverage and reducing Lehman’s balance sheet, Valukas’s report shows. Failing to do so could lead to a ratings downgrade, inflicting “an immediate, tangible monetary impact” on Lehman, the report said. The bank, which had been using the repos since 2001, ramped them up in mid-2007, breaching internal limits, the report shows. Lehman’s former president, Herbert “Bart” McDade , commented on them in an April 2008 e-mail exchange, after he was asked whether he knew about their effect on the balance sheet, Valukas said. “I am very aware,” McDade wrote back. “It is another drug we r on.” Repo Presentation Fuld received a presentation referencing Repo 105s in March 2008, and McDade recalled discussing the transactions with the CEO in June of that year, according to the report. “Fuld knew about the accounting of Repo 105,” McDade said in an interview with Valukas on Jan. 28 this year. “At no time did Lehman’s senior financial officers, legal counsel or Ernst & Young raise any concerns about the use of Repo 105 with Mr. Fuld, who throughout his career faithfully and diligently worked in the interests of Lehman and its stakeholders,” Hynes wrote in her statement. The transactions were done in accordance with an internal accounting policy and supported by legal opinions, she said. In a repo agreement, one party temporarily transfers a security to another as collateral for short-term cash. A Repo 105 transaction requires extra collateral, making it a more costly form of borrowing. Lehman accounted for the Repo 105s as “sales,” as opposed to financing transactions, Valukas said. The bankruptcy case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan). To contact the reporters on this story: David Scheer in New York at dscheer@bloomberg.net .