larry-summers

“The Social Network” got me thinking. I’m sure that it got most people who watched it thinking, possibly far beyond the fact that it is a well-made and well-acted film. It was one line in particular, and one that caem from a section of the film that did not involve the main characters who created Facebook. As the Winklevoss twins beg the Harvard president for sanctions against Zuckerberg, the president, Larry Summers, makes an observation of Harvard graduates as a group. I’m paraphrasing here as I don’t exactly recall the line, but it went something like this: “Harvard students believe it’s better to invent a job than to find a job.” This concept of being creative in terms of your life direction is undeniably inspiring, but I was not sure exactly what message the actor was trying to convey. On the one hand, it might have been an observation that the top U.S. university creates leaders and innovators (something admirable), but on the other hand, it might have been a criticism that the same group of talented individuals never wants to fit into an existing framework that the rest of society complies with and fits into. It must be true that the privilege of being able to do what Zuckerberg did with Facebook requires one or more of the following: wealth (as was required for Facebook to exist), intellect, creativity, boredom, ambition and the confidence that accompanies it. I am extremely fortunate to have the freedom to pursue a career that similarly does not fit into a standard career framework. I wake up each (or almost each!) day looking forward to what I’m going to be doing. Many people do not have the opportunities or the self-belief to do this. I suppose this fact is what sparked my uncertainty about the double-edge of the Harvard president’s comments in the film. How do you approach work and careers? Do you think that the approach of “invent a job, don’t find one” is what drives our society forward or a selfish privilege afforded by the few? There might be the feeling that anyone can go from humble beginnings to greatness or prominence, but in truth this is helped enormously by education and opportunity.

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Alex Hibbert: What I Got From ‘The Social Network’

Is finance too mighty? Is finance a leech upon the real economy or a Keynesian magneto? Did finance balloon after the ’70s for good reasons, like the need to drive an advanced, post-industrial, capital-intensive economy? Or was it all about greed? Were there other, practical options beside steroidal finance to generate that growth? Three years after the crisis began with a burp in the subprime subbasement, these questions elicit scant consensus. Instead, sides have formed, trenches dug, mortar rounds flung at each other, followed by name-calling. Of course, Wall Street is excessively large. Of course, Fat-Cat City sucked the life from Main Street. Look how we prospered in the ’50s and ’60s without securitization, derivatives, firms the size of planets. Contemplate the speculatin’ rich! Bailout babies! Then, of course, chest-high in mud, huddle the we-can’t-break-up-the-banks-and-shrink-Wall-Street rump. They fire back: Only a large, complex, innovative financial sector can provide the liquidity to drive a mature economy in a take-no-prisoners world. The ’80s and ’90s were swell. Ponder the rise of China and India. Got any better ideas to generate growth? The big vs. small finance debate feeds other matters, like who’s to blame. Alas, think deeply about it and you end up with a mash-up of free will and determinism. How much human agency went into designing the system that blew up so spectacularly? What were the articles of faith in the ’70s and ’80s? (What, in fact, does “wrong” mean — over short term or long?) Policymakers clearly believed big was better than small, deep markets better than thin, free better than constrained, complexity better than simplicity. Were they wrong? Regulatory decisions to liberalize markets were justified by competitiveness, efficiency, productivity. Heavily regulated commercial banks struggled in an increasingly market-dominated world, so the Federal Reserve freed them, loophole by loophole, to compete. Conventional wisdom saw size as a necessity. And so barriers fell, creating a purportedly more efficient banking system (and many believed right up to 2008, a safer one). Did many profit from those decisions? Did the structure of finance grow simpler as institutions became more complex? Did decisions spawn unintended consequences and trigger further lockstep change? Say you were in charge in 1975. What would you have done differently? It’s a tribute to the relative paucity of alternative economic ideas, particularly in America, that it’s hard to imagine a different outcome. The ’70s were a grim decade, arguably as bleak as today. Market liberalization was a path to reviving prosperity; the competitiveness debate was about combating decline. Meanwhile, down in the basement, something was happening, and it wasn’t just rising oil prices and Islamic agitators. Industrial profits were shrinking. As trade barriers fell, lower-cost nations, beginning with Japan, proved more efficient at producing manufactured goods; others, in waves, followed. Should we have turned inward? Could we have preserved the postwar boom in amber, like ’50s-era Chevys in Havana? The Cold War still rumbled. The economy was being rewired with digital technology. Services (like finance) were booming. Women went to work — by choice and necessity. Job mobility soared, corporate loyalty fell. Companies, suddenly interested in shareholders, dumped retirement planning onto workers. Credit fueled consumer spending. Could anyone be elected in America who promised, in the slogan of that era, “limits to growth?” In the early ’90s, Paul Krugman still despaired of American debility, rooted in lousy productivity. Mistakes were subsequently made, regulatory capture occurred and self-interest deepened. But we rose from the slough of ’70s despond. True, by the ’90s complexity fueled greater complexity; bureaucracy spawned more bureaucracy; ideas went from fresh to dogmatic to imprisoning. The efficient-market hypothesis was once a fertile idea, only to morph into policy, then ideology. Necessity ruled. The gospel of consumption, competitiveness and opportunity was, and is, powerful. Growth was a winning issue for Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. In the late ’80s, as fears over Japan raged, Larry Summers proposed a Tobin tax to reduce financial transactions — an idea that went nowhere and one he dropped. That was the last time a Tobin tax got any play (it wasn’t much) until U.K. financial regulator Adair Turner revived it last year. In 2007, even a liberal critic such as Robert Reich could write admiringly in “Supercapitalism” about our economic machine; he worried that it was so successful at feeding consumer desires that democracy was threatened. Inequality was troublesome, but who could foresee breakdown? All this is not to argue for passivity in the face of perceived necessity. It is an attempt to understand how our wise men proved so fallible and to wonder what ideas we’re becoming enslaved to today. See the complete archives of the Editor’s Note Robert Teitelman is Editor In Chief of The Deal

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Robert Teitelman: Transactions: Oct. 18, 2010

Robert Lenzner: The New World Order Of Global Markets

October 9, 2010

The best minds in finance–George Soros, Mohammed El-Erian, Larry Summers, Joseph Stiglitz and Robert Rubin–were not exactly raving bulls at the Financial Times conference on “The Future of Finance” this week. They were not the force driving the Dow Jones industrial average through 11,000 Friday, rather they were arguing convincingly of the constraints evident in the global economy that are bound to make investing anywhere more difficult and different than ever before.

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Larry Summers And The Subversion of Economics

October 7, 2010

The Obama administration recently announced that Larry Summers is resigning as director of the National Economic Council and will return to Harvard early next year. His imminent departure raises several questions: Who will replace him? What will he do next? But more important, it’s a chance to consider the hugely damaging conflicts of interest of the senior academic economists who move among universities, government, and banking.

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Obama Hedges On Possible Geithner, Summers Departures

September 20, 2010

President Barack Obama hedged Monday on whether he planned to keep Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and economic adviser Larry Summers on his staff after the midterm election. CNBC reporter John Harwood posed the question to Obama during a town hall meeting on the economy in Washington. “I have not made any determinations about personnel,” the president said. “Larry Summers and Tim Geithner have done an outstanding job, as have my whole economic team. This is tough, the work that they do. They’ve been at it for two years. And, you know, they’re going to have a whole range of decisions about family that’ll factor into this as well.”

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Ian Fletcher: Economics vs. Fakeonomics

September 16, 2010

We skeptics of free trade are used to being told, “You don’t understand economics.” In fact, one major reason I wrote the book Free Trade Doesn’t Work was simply to expose, once and for all, that there do exist extremely serious and intellectually reputable arguments, within the confines of accepted mainstream economics, which question free trade. And indeed they exist. But I’ve noticed something. We skeptics are often not really struggling against real economics at all. When I pick up a copy of the Wall Street Journal , or Forbes , or the New York Times , or turn on Fox TV or MSNBC, or read papers issued by the libertarian Cato Institute or the Peterson Institute for International Economics, I don’t even find economic arguments. I find a mischievous substitute for economics we can call “fakeonomics.” What is fakeonomics? It sounds like economics to the uninitiated. It uses the same language, addresses the same issues and fills the same logical hole in the national policy discourse. Most people can’t tell the difference. But fakeonomics is not the real thing. How is fakeonomics fake? It tells a story that goes something like this… • Free markets are always right, always and everywhere. • Anyone who doesn’t believe this is stupid. Smart people not only understand that free markets are best, they like free markets, because free markets mean opportunities to get rich. • Or maybe they’re corrupt. The opposite of free markets is government. Government is always incompetent. It never does anything right. Ever. • Or maybe they’re evil. Anyone who doesn’t believe in perfectly free markets is a Marxist wannabe or a loser jealous of more-successful people. • Free trade is just free markets applied internationally. • Therefore all smart, good, successful people must believe in free trade. Unfortunately, fakeonomics is at best a crude parody of economics. It is often larded with a thick layer of moral hectoring, courtesy of a certain variety of the American Right which seems to think that economics is its exclusive property, a stick given it by God to beat liberals with. There is even a whole class of people, known as “libertarians” who elevate fakeonomics to the level of an all-encompassing moral ideology. (Their fundamentalist sect is the old Ayn Rand cult, who call themselves “objectivists.”) So let’s be clear about one thing: real economics does not support the idea that 100 percent pure free markets are best. Not domestically, not internationally. That’s why the U.S. has, like every other developed nation, a mixed economy, with government amounting to about 35 percent (pre-2008; it’s spiked since then) of our GDP and various laws, from child labor laws to environmental laws and the SEC, regulating much of the rest. It’s easy to fulminate against this fact in beautiful after-dinner speeches about economic liberty, but the reality is that when in office, even conservative Republicans grasp the necessity of most of these policies — whatever adjustments on the margin they may make. Surveys indeed show that about 90 percent of economists support free trade. But, and this is crucial, only about 70 percent of them support it without reservation . Economists are, in fact, well aware of a number of problems with free trade, like: • Free trade for America is one-sided, with most major foreign economies practicing managed trade of one kind or another. • When free trade involves trade deficits, it may be optimal in the short run but is unsustainable over longer time horizons. • Even if it increases GDP, it has even stronger effects on income distribution and can thus harm many, or even most, of the people in the economy. • The adjustment costs of declining industries — from unemployment checks to the rubble of Detroit — are huge and ongoing. • It brings us cheap goods today at the price of building up economic rivals who will take markets away from us tomorrow. • It helps dirty industries move from environmentally-strict jurisdictions to environmentally-lax ones. • Even if it is efficient in the short run, efficiency per se has little to do with long-term economic growth. • The theory of comparative advantage — which supposedly proves that free trade guarantees win-win outcomes — doesn’t hold in the presence of capital mobility between nations. None of the above is especially new information, though these points are legitimately controversial like anything else. My point here is simply that economics does not grant free trade the blank check many people seem to think it does. Nonetheless, the juggernaut of fakeonomics, which doesn’t understand this, rolls on. The really scary thing about fakeonomics is that it is not just a vulgar version of economics, served up to amuse the audience of Bill O’Reilly’s TV show. It is also believed in by people who should know better. Like it or not, fakeonomics is mistaken for real thinking by a disturbingly large number of people with top MBAs, graduate degrees in serious fields, congressional staffers, et cetera. (I know; my job obliges me to talk to these people all the time, and they tell me so.) Perhaps it’s just laziness on their part, but people who should be taking their bearings from more serious sources — people whose careers depend upon the idea that they have genuine expertise — are drawing their ideas from fakeonomics. These are people who pride themselves on understanding the most sophisticated ideas when it comes to, say, corporate finance, but here they are, relying upon intellectual constructs of a chat-show level of sophistication. Make no mistake: Fakeonomics matters. For one thing, it is the implied theoretical model of current U.S. trade policy. That is to say, if one looks at American trade policy and asks what picture of the economy one would have to hold in order to believe that these policies make sense, fakeonomics is that picture. So whatever sophisticated version of real economics someone like ex-Harvard professor Larry Summers may have tucked away in his head somewhere, when he acts as economic adviser to President Obama, fakeonomics is what he dishes out. One can, of course, gin up rationalizations bridging the gap between real economics and fakeonomics on any given issue at will. So there’s no point confronting people like Larry Summers with the gap between, say, their own theoretical writings and the policies they support in office. If they weren’t bright enough to pull off a piece of minor casuistry like that, they wouldn’t be where they are in the first place. Why are the nominally sophisticated so misguided? Because fakeonomics tells them what they want to hear. At bottom, fakeonomics is the ultimate free lunch story. Its seductive message is that we can consume all we want, right now , and never worry about the consequences. “Free” trade translates as “don’t worry about” trade. The market forgives all sins. Unfortunately for this happy fantasy, fakeonomics can only maintain this fantasy vision by systematically ignoring half of economic reality. It is, for one thing, almost exclusively focused on consumption, ignoring the production side of the economy. So it has plenty to say about how cheap imports provide consumers lower prices, but blithely airbrushes out of the picture the way imports deplete our industrial base. Of course, in the long run, nobody can afford imports, however cheap, without the ability to produce something to exchange for them. But that, of course, is the long run, and fakeonomics is about instant gratification and letting the chickens come home to roost in the next administration. What does all this mean? It means that there are really two targets, for those of us who would criticize free trade. There is economics per se , which tends to be pro-free trade, but is actually surprisingly well aware of the counterarguments and becoming slowly but inexorably more skeptical. And there is fakeonomics, which is dogmatically pro-free trade, proactively ignorant of the counterarguments, and determined to stick its head in the sand. Shooting at the first target does almost nothing, unfortunately, to hit the latter, which is arguably more important, at least in the short run, for determining real-world policy outcomes. As a result, the first question one must ask when querying some piece of economic reasoning offered as justification for policy is this: is it real? Or is it fakeonomics? Ian Fletcher is the author of the Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What Should Replace It and Why (USBIC, 2010, $24.95) An Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council , a Washington think tank founded in 1933, he was previously an economist in private practice, mostly serving hedge funds and private equity firms. He may be contacted at ian.fletcher@usbic.net .

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Ian Fletcher: Economics vs. Fakeonomics

September 16, 2010

We skeptics of free trade are used to being told, “You don’t understand economics.” In fact, one major reason I wrote the book Free Trade Doesn’t Work was simply to expose, once and for all, that there do exist extremely serious and intellectually reputable arguments, within the confines of accepted mainstream economics, which question free trade. And indeed they exist. But I’ve noticed something. We skeptics are often not really struggling against real economics at all. When I pick up a copy of the Wall Street Journal , or Forbes , or the New York Times , or turn on Fox TV or MSNBC, or read papers issued by the libertarian Cato Institute or the Peterson Institute for International Economics, I don’t even find economic arguments. I find a mischievous substitute for economics we can call “fakeonomics.” What is fakeonomics? It sounds like economics to the uninitiated. It uses the same language, addresses the same issues and fills the same logical hole in the national policy discourse. Most people can’t tell the difference. But fakeonomics is not the real thing. How is fakeonomics fake? It tells a story that goes something like this… • Free markets are always right, always and everywhere. • Anyone who doesn’t believe this is stupid. Smart people not only understand that free markets are best, they like free markets, because free markets mean opportunities to get rich. • Or maybe they’re corrupt. The opposite of free markets is government. Government is always incompetent. It never does anything right. Ever. • Or maybe they’re evil. Anyone who doesn’t believe in perfectly free markets is a Marxist wannabe or a loser jealous of more-successful people. • Free trade is just free markets applied internationally. • Therefore all smart, good, successful people must believe in free trade. Unfortunately, fakeonomics is at best a crude parody of economics. It is often larded with a thick layer of moral hectoring, courtesy of a certain variety of the American Right which seems to think that economics is its exclusive property, a stick given it by God to beat liberals with. There is even a whole class of people, known as “libertarians” who elevate fakeonomics to the level of an all-encompassing moral ideology. (Their fundamentalist sect is the old Ayn Rand cult, who call themselves “objectivists.”) So let’s be clear about one thing: real economics does not support the idea that 100 percent pure free markets are best. Not domestically, not internationally. That’s why the U.S. has, like every other developed nation, a mixed economy, with government amounting to about 35 percent (pre-2008; it’s spiked since then) of our GDP and various laws, from child labor laws to environmental laws and the SEC, regulating much of the rest. It’s easy to fulminate against this fact in beautiful after-dinner speeches about economic liberty, but the reality is that when in office, even conservative Republicans grasp the necessity of most of these policies — whatever adjustments on the margin they may make. Surveys indeed show that about 90 percent of economists support free trade. But, and this is crucial, only about 70 percent of them support it without reservation . Economists are, in fact, well aware of a number of problems with free trade, like: • Free trade for America is one-sided, with most major foreign economies practicing managed trade of one kind or another. • When free trade involves trade deficits, it may be optimal in the short run but is unsustainable over longer time horizons. • Even if it increases GDP, it has even stronger effects on income distribution and can thus harm many, or even most, of the people in the economy. • The adjustment costs of declining industries — from unemployment checks to the rubble of Detroit — are huge and ongoing. • It brings us cheap goods today at the price of building up economic rivals who will take markets away from us tomorrow. • It helps dirty industries move from environmentally-strict jurisdictions to environmentally-lax ones. • Even if it is efficient in the short run, efficiency per se has little to do with long-term economic growth. • The theory of comparative advantage — which supposedly proves that free trade guarantees win-win outcomes — doesn’t hold in the presence of capital mobility between nations. None of the above is especially new information, though these points are legitimately controversial like anything else. My point here is simply that economics does not grant free trade the blank check many people seem to think it does. Nonetheless, the juggernaut of fakeonomics, which doesn’t understand this, rolls on. The really scary thing about fakeonomics is that it is not just a vulgar version of economics, served up to amuse the audience of Bill O’Reilly’s TV show. It is also believed in by people who should know better. Like it or not, fakeonomics is mistaken for real thinking by a disturbingly large number of people with top MBAs, graduate degrees in serious fields, congressional staffers, et cetera. (I know; my job obliges me to talk to these people all the time, and they tell me so.) Perhaps it’s just laziness on their part, but people who should be taking their bearings from more serious sources — people whose careers depend upon the idea that they have genuine expertise — are drawing their ideas from fakeonomics. These are people who pride themselves on understanding the most sophisticated ideas when it comes to, say, corporate finance, but here they are, relying upon intellectual constructs of a chat-show level of sophistication. Make no mistake: Fakeonomics matters. For one thing, it is the implied theoretical model of current U.S. trade policy. That is to say, if one looks at American trade policy and asks what picture of the economy one would have to hold in order to believe that these policies make sense, fakeonomics is that picture. So whatever sophisticated version of real economics someone like ex-Harvard professor Larry Summers may have tucked away in his head somewhere, when he acts as economic adviser to President Obama, fakeonomics is what he dishes out. One can, of course, gin up rationalizations bridging the gap between real economics and fakeonomics on any given issue at will. So there’s no point confronting people like Larry Summers with the gap between, say, their own theoretical writings and the policies they support in office. If they weren’t bright enough to pull off a piece of minor casuistry like that, they wouldn’t be where they are in the first place. Why are the nominally sophisticated so misguided? Because fakeonomics tells them what they want to hear. At bottom, fakeonomics is the ultimate free lunch story. Its seductive message is that we can consume all we want, right now , and never worry about the consequences. “Free” trade translates as “don’t worry about” trade. The market forgives all sins. Unfortunately for this happy fantasy, fakeonomics can only maintain this fantasy vision by systematically ignoring half of economic reality. It is, for one thing, almost exclusively focused on consumption, ignoring the production side of the economy. So it has plenty to say about how cheap imports provide consumers lower prices, but blithely airbrushes out of the picture the way imports deplete our industrial base. Of course, in the long run, nobody can afford imports, however cheap, without the ability to produce something to exchange for them. But that, of course, is the long run, and fakeonomics is about instant gratification and letting the chickens come home to roost in the next administration. What does all this mean? It means that there are really two targets, for those of us who would criticize free trade. There is economics per se , which tends to be pro-free trade, but is actually surprisingly well aware of the counterarguments and becoming slowly but inexorably more skeptical. And there is fakeonomics, which is dogmatically pro-free trade, proactively ignorant of the counterarguments, and determined to stick its head in the sand. Shooting at the first target does almost nothing, unfortunately, to hit the latter, which is arguably more important, at least in the short run, for determining real-world policy outcomes. As a result, the first question one must ask when querying some piece of economic reasoning offered as justification for policy is this: is it real? Or is it fakeonomics? Ian Fletcher is the author of the Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What Should Replace It and Why (USBIC, 2010, $24.95) An Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council , a Washington think tank founded in 1933, he was previously an economist in private practice, mostly serving hedge funds and private equity firms. He may be contacted at ian.fletcher@usbic.net .

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Amy Siskind: The Obama Old Boys Club — Does the White House Economic Team Have a Woman Problem?

July 20, 2010

When FDR devised the policies which led our country out of the Great Depression, he had a secret weapon — his wife, Eleanor. Regrettably, as we struggle our way out of the worse economic crisis since then, Treasury Secretary Geithner is attempting to silence one of the few female voices in leading us out: Elizabeth Warren. This despite ample evidence that having more women in financial leadership, ala Lehman Brothers and Lehman Sisters , is optimal for balancing risk in our financial system. The two men leading our country’s economic policy, Geithner and Larry Summers, seem unwilling and perhaps incapable of working with women. That is why President Obama should not only nomination Elizabeth Warren to head the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, but also proactively seek to add gender balance to his economic inner circle. Geithner’s opposition to Warren is not his first clash with women in power. One of his first acts in the role of Treasury Secretary was to attempt to push out FDIC Chairwoman Shelia Bair. As Rep. Barney Frank observed : “I think part of the problem now, to be honest, is Sheila Bair has annoyed the ‘old boys’ club…we have several regulators up in the tree house with a ‘no girls allowed’ sign…” Geithner’s inability to respectfully interact with women in positions of power was further in evidence when he was questioned in April by the Congressional Oversight Panel. Warren rightfully asked Geithner about AIG’s funneling billions of taxpayers’ dollars to Goldman Sachs: Do you know where the money went? Geithner could barely conceal his disdain: watch his angry, condescending response here . Of course, Warren was correct. Taxpayers did not need to pay Goldman Sachs one hundred cents on the dollar, resulting in Goldman booking a $6 billion dollar gain . Geithner should well know. Also in 2009 under his watch, our government strong-armed creditors of Chrysler into taking massive discounts to their original investments. Like Geithner, Larry Summers has a well documented pattern of not being able to work with and silencing women. In fact, our current economic crisis could have been adverted if Summers had paid attention to Brooksley Born, then chairwoman of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In 1998, Born issued an unequivocal warning to Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and Summers of the risks inherent in not regulating derivatives. Summers was one to silence Born : … “Summers called Ms. Born and chastised her for taking steps he said would lead to a financial crisis.” Michael Greenberger, a senior director at the commission at the time, noted : “Brooksley was this woman who was not playing tennis with these guys and not having lunch with these guys. There was a little bit of the feeling that this woman was not of Wall Street.” Likewise, in 2002, derivatives whiz Iris Mack voiced concerns to Summers about Harvard Endowment Company’s use of risky derivatives. A few months late, Mack was fired . Another woman silenced: another warning of risk unheeded. The problem goes deeper still. President Obama’s economic inner circle includes only one woman: Christina Romer. And of course, it is hardly a secret that tensions are high for Ms. Romer and her all male colleagues, including Larry Summers: Mrs. Romer was joking, she said in an interview, adding, “There are only a few times that I felt like smacking Larry.” Yet few laughed in the president’s presence. One can only imagine. Romer is girl trying to operate in a boys’ club. Which is why it’s time for President Obama to knock the door off of the boys’ club and let the girls into his inner economic circle. We can hardly afford to lose another immensely qualified woman. The opportunity cost to our economic prosperity is simply too great.

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Obama And Geithner Have A ‘Man-Crush’ On Each Other: New York Magazine

May 24, 2010

Embattled Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner looms large in John Heilemann’s New York magazine piece detailing the Obama administration’s increasingly strained relationship with Wall Street. And if his reporting is any indication, the president and the Treasury Secretary still have an ongoing “man-crush” on each other. Since he took over in early 2009, Geithner has been seen by many as an embodiment of the Wall Street establishment. Heilemann notes that he’s been accused of working for Goldman Sachs — even by members of the mainstream press. (Geithner, a regulator by trade, has never worked for any Wall Street bank.) Geithner emerged as a candidate for Treasury Secretary after former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, then 81, was ruled out and Larry Summers, the former president of Harvard, was deemed too politically divisive, Heilemann reports. After taking the helm at Treasury, Geithner quickly became Obama’s confidant through a combination of his moderate political leanings and a hesitancy to enforce sweeping, broad changes to the financial system. Here’s Heilemann: Indeed, the president’s support for his Treasury secretary has been unwavering. (Axelrod would laugh at rumors that Geithner was about to get the boot: “Don’t these people realize they have a man-crush on each other?”) And Obama’s loyalty has been repaid with results. Geithner’s stabilization plan is now widely regarded as having worked — mainly thanks to the once-derided “stress tests” that he imposed on the banks, which showed the world that their circumstances weren’t as dire as many feared and let them raise the requisite capital to get back on their feet. If Geithner is Obama’s trusted ear on all matters economic, it may be because Geithner seems to share an overriding belief that the financial industry — the nation’s largest banks in particular — needed only a certain amount of added regulatory scrutiny. The Obama administration’s chosen method to rescue the economy, Heilemann suggests, was to harness the expertise of a well-connected, but centrist financial mandarin like Geithner. Months later, however, the implications of Obama’s philosophical allegiance to Geithner seems to have been made manifest in the Senate’s recently passed financial reform bill, which, the

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Larry Summers Defends Record On Derivatives During Clinton Administration

May 16, 2010

Last month, Bill Clinton told ABC News that his former Treasury Secretaries, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, gave him wrong advice on derivatives, and that he was wrong to take it. Though Clinton quickly walked back the remark , it continues to reverberate around Washington. Today, on CNN, Fareed Zakaria asked Summers about Clinton’s comment and whether he’d changed his mind about derivatives. Summers responded by saying that, like Keynes, “when conditions change, I change my views,” and he defended his record during the Clinton administration: Credit default swaps were in their infancy in the 1990s. There was no large market in them, and yet we see how much damage they did. It’s a very different kind of need that’s been pointed out and why we’ve worked so hard to strengthen derivatives regulation. To take just one example, we’ve seen what damage can be done by leveraging. In the 90s, as secretary of the Treasury, I warned about the dangers of the leverage associated with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those dangers have become more pervasive over the last 10 years. So I think there has always been a case, and one I have always tried to make, for regulation, but that case has certainly gotten stronger, given what has happened.

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Clinton Says Rubin, Summers Gave Him `Wrong’ Advice on Derivatives Rules

April 18, 2010

By Joshua Zumbrun April 18 (Bloomberg) — Former President Bill Clinton said he should have pushed for regulation of financial derivatives when he was president, rejecting the advice of top economic advisers Robert Rubin and Larry Summers . The argument was that derivatives didn’t need transparency because they were “expensive and sophisticated and only a handful of people would buy them,” Clinton said on ABC’s “This Week” program. “The flaw in this argument was that first of all, sometimes people with a lot of money make stupid decisions and make it without transparency.” “Even if less than 1 percent of the total investment community is involved in derivative exchanges, so much money was involved that if they went bad, they could affect 100 percent of the investments,” Clinton said. The show was taped yesterday for broadcast today. Tighter regulation of derivatives trading is part of a package of financial reforms being pushed by the Obama administration against Republican opposition. The Senate is debating a bill introduced by Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd that would also give the federal government the authority to unravel institutions whose failure threatens the financial system. Bush Blamed Clinton also said the Bush administration contributed to the financial crisis with lax regulation. “I think what happened was the SEC and the whole regulatory apparatus after I left office was just let go,” Clinton said. If Clinton’s head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt , had remained in that job, “an enormous percentage of what we’ve been through in the last eight years would not have happened,” Clinton said. Levitt is a director of Bloomberg LP, parent of Bloomberg News. Clinton also said that Republicans who controlled Congress would have stopped him from trying to regulate derivatives. “I wish I had been caught trying,” Clinton said. “I mean, that was a mistake I made.” To contact the reporter on this story: Joshua Zumbrun in Washington at jzumbrun@bloomberg.net

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Robert Reich: Greenspan, Summers, and Why the Economy Is So Out of Whack

April 4, 2010

I’m in the “green room” at ABC News, waiting to join a roundtable panel discussion on ABC’s weekly Sunday news program, This Week . Alan Greenspan is now being interviewed. He says he bore no responsibility for the housing bubble that catapulted the nation into a financial crisis in 2008 because no one could have known about the bubble when he chaired the Fed in the years before it burst. Larry Summers was interviewed just before Greenspan. He said the economy is expanding, that the administration is doing everything it can to bring jobs back, and that the regulatory reform bills moving on the Hill will prevent another financial crisis. What? If any single person is most responsible for the financial crisis, it’s Alan Greenspan. He presided over a Fed that lowered interest rates to zero (adjusted for inflation) but failed to prevent banks from using essentially free money to speculate wildly. You do not have to be a brain surgeon to understand that if money is free, banks will take it and lend it out. And if oversight is inadequate, the banks will lend the money to anyone who can stand up straight and to many who cannot. The result will be a giant subprime lending bubble that will burst. If any three people are most responsible for the failure of financial regulation, they are Greenspan, Larry Summers, and my former colleague, Bob Rubin. In 1999 they advised Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, which since 1933 had separated commercial from investment banking. By 1999, Wall Street was salivating over such a repeal because it wanted to create financial supermarkets that could use commercial deposits to place bets in the financial casino. That would yield the Street trillions. At the same time, Greenspan, Summers, and Rubin also quashed the efforts of the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation to regulate derivatives, when its director began to worry that derivative trading already was getting out of control. Yet Greenspan continues to take no responsibility for what occurred. In the interview he just completed he avoiding saying anything about the failure of the Fed under his watch to adequately oversee the banks, and the absence of sufficient financial regulation to begin with. I dislike singling out individuals for blame or praise in a political system as complex as that of the United States but I worry the nation is not on the right economic road, and that these individuals — one of whom advises the President directly and the others who continue to exert substantial influence among policy makers — still don’t get it. The direction financial reform is taking is not encouraging. Both the bill that emerged from the House and the one emerging from the Senate are filled with loopholes that continue to allow reckless trading of derivatives. Neither bill adequately prevents banks from becoming insolvent because of their reckless trades. Neither limits the size of banks or busts up the big ones. Neither resurrects the Glass-Steagall Act. Neither adequately regulates hedge funds. More fundamentally, neither bill begins to rectify the basic distortion in the national economy whose rewards and incentives are grotesquely tipped toward Wall Street and financial entrepreneurialism, and away from Main Street and real entrepreneurialism. It was just reported, for example, that America’s top 25 hedge fund managers last year earned an average of $3 billion each. They continue to pay a federal income tax of 15 percent on most of that, by the way, because their lobbying efforts have been so successful. Meanwhile, the so-called jobs bills emerging from Congress and the White House are puny relative to the challenge of restoring jobs in America. Last Friday’s jobs report, read most positively, showed 112,000 jobs added to the economy in March. But that’s below the number needed simply to keep up with an expanding population. In other words, we’re actually worse off now than we were a month ago. At the same time, the median wage of Americans with jobs keep dropping. The American economy is seriously out of whack. The two people interviewed this morning don’t seem to understand how far. Cross-posted from RobertReich.org

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Simon Johnson: Contradicting Secretary Geithner

April 2, 2010

Crossposted with The Baseline Scenario . Speaking Thursday morning on the Today Show , Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner insisted on two points : 1. If the bank rescue of 2008-09 had been handled in any other way — for example, being tougher on bankers — the costs to the real economy would have been substantially higher. “again, what was the choice the president had to make? He had to decide whether he was gonna act to fix [the banking system] or stand back because it might be more popular not to have to do that kind of stuff, and that would have been calamitous for the American economy, much, much worse than what we went through already.” 2. The reform legislation currently before Congress would end all concerns regarding Too Big To Fail in the future. “The president’s not gonna sign a bill that doesn’t have strong enough teeth.” In 13 Bankers , we disagree strongly with point number one ( see this excerpt ) and find point number two so at odds with reality that it is scary. Friday morning, also on the Today Show , I have a brief opportunity to suggest a different narrative. First and foremost, it is impossible to believe that the government could not have been tougher on banks and bankers in spring 2009. The idea that every failed top banker needed to keep his job — and that every director of a failed bank needed to stay in place — is simply preposterous. Of course, the people who ran our biggest banks onto the rocks think they are indispensable, but as Charles de Gaulle reportedly said , “”The cemeteries of the world are full of indispensable men.” This is not about being vindictive. This is about holding people accountable. We argue in 13 Bankers that the government could have taken over big insolvent banks — and applied a FDIC-type resolution process. At the very least, top management and boards of directors at failed banks — i.e., all those rescued by the government — should have been fired. Not only that — but all those people should have had their contracts broken and their bonuses clawed back to the full extent possible. Losing personal money is the only thing that modern American financial executives ultimately understand. And if that was breach of contract — let them sue and good luck to them in court; just think of the extra evidence for wrongdoing that would uncover. The costs of this excessively nice approach are enormous. “[I]t is certain that a healthy financial system cannot be built on the expectation of bailouts” — that’s what Larry Summers said in his 2000 Ely Lecture to the American Economic Association, and it’s true (see the American Economic Review , Vol. 90, No. 2; no free weblink available). Now we have a system where the biggest banks expect to be saved, come what may — and the credit markets share that view. This is monstrously unfair and extremely dangerous. In fact, it’s exactly the kind of financial structure that Larry Summers railed against in 2000 — that lecture was mostly about “emerging markets” and how they get into repeated financial crises. This is where the US is now heading. As for the financial reform bill now before Congress, Secretary Geithner is completely wrong if he thinks it “has teeth.” There is simply nothing there that will rein in our largest financial institutions — and you can see this in the financial markets. Even as some sort of legislation moves closer to passing, massive banks retain their funding advantage — and continue to look for ways to get larger (see Jamie Dimon’s letter to his shareholders this week ). And as a symptom of these continuing problems, see the latest round on executive pay at banks — we’re back to cash and other short-term oriented payouts . This administration recognizes that such incentives are dangerous — particularly when combined with implicit government guarantees. But they can do nothing — and will do nothing — about this or about the deeper underlying issues. The biggest and most dangerous elements of Wall Street have taken over Washington.

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Diane Francis: Eurogate — The New Fannie, Freddie and AIG

February 8, 2010

“This is a statistical recovery and a human recession.” — Larry Summers It was the best one-liner I heard come out of the recent World Economic Forum in Davos. Of course one week later, speculation rife in sessions entitled, “Will there be a double dip?” were overtaken by the Double Dip itself. Markets began roiling after the European Union’s central banker and various leaders admitted that they had not ever undertaken, nor required, independent audits to monitor the financial behavior of the Euro’s 16 user-nations. They took their finance ministers’ words for it. Sounds like the Bush regime which took their Wall Streeters’ words for it. We enter a new currency melee which gives “Beware the Greeks” new meaning. Greece is only the beginning of a new Euro Plague, whose value will be drubbed by a complete failure to supervise members — a governance lapse every bit as reckless as the deregulatory religion that brought down the U.S. and British economies. The Euro’s woes will drives up the bailouts required by Germany and France, the uber-Euro nations, and will lead to more collapses. Enter the “PIGS” — Portugal Italy, Spain as well as Greece — which have been a currency headache to many since 2008. These countries are the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG of Europe and the loans required to keep them afloat promise to be Europe’s sub-prime equivalents. This is because these basketcase countries are cheaters when it came to the voluntary rules and regulations that were designed to uphold the integrity and value of the Euro. So much for Sarkozy’s Gallic finger-wagging in Davos at the Anglo-Saxon economies and their laissez faire regulatory regime that brought about the world’s collapse in 2007-08. Conclusion? China rising. Too bad we cannot invest in their currency because it would be going through the roof.

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Larry Summers: US Experiencing ‘Statistical Recovery And Human Recession’

January 30, 2010

Key Obama economic adviser Larry Summers coined a telling way to look at the current American economic state of play. He said the U.S. is experiencing a “statistical recovery and a human recession.”

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John Dugan, OCC Head: ‘Master Of Disaster’ Is Banks’ Hidden Ally In Deregulation Push

December 24, 2009

Of all the architects of last year’s financial crash, John Dugan remains the most obscure, despite his stature as one of the most influential. While regulatory errors have made Larry Summers, Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan household names, most people have never heard either of Dugan or his agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. But as the chief regulator for the largest US banks, Dugan and his staff are one of the most powerful engines of economic policy in the world

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Willem Buiter: Citigroup Critic Is Bank’s New Chief Economist

November 30, 2009

Outspoken economist Willem Buiter, a professor at the London School of Economics and consultant to Goldman Sachs, has accepted a position as Chief Economist at Citigroup , a bank he’s certainly had no qualms about criticizing. As recently as last April, on his blog at the Financial Times, Buiter has attacked Citi for being, “A conglomeration of worst practice from the across the financial spectrum.” Other criticisms Buiter has made about banks which bear no small resemblance his new employer include this monster : Citigroup suffers from, “[A] survival of the fattest syndrome … has turned banks and shadow-banking institutions into monsters of perverse incentives for excessive risk taking. Throughout the north-Atlantic region, concentration and monopoly power in the banking sector will be higher after the crisis than before it.” Which isn’t to say Buiter’s writings have escaped criticism. Fed Governor Frederic Mishkin has said that Buiter’s writings have fired, “a lot of unguided missiles,” and former Vice Chairman Alan Blinder “respectfully disagreed” with his analysis of the central bank’s crisis management. A staunch opponent of bailouts, Buiter opined: “I cannot think of a single financial institution that is too big to fail, in the sense that it would damage some systemically important social institution…. I recognize the upside of bail-outs for those who arrange them: they look like movers and shakers, making and shaping events. It’s heroic, in an industry where heroism can be rarely displayed. But in all of the examples mentioned above, the bail-out did more harm than good.” As Salon’s Andrew Leonard points out, there is definitely no shortage of irony here: Buiter will be taking a paycheck from one of the very biggest of the bailed-out too-big-to-fail institutions. Which means, whether he likes it or not, Buiter is being bankrolled with the support of the American taxpayer… and implicit backing of Larry Summers. If Citigroup hadn’t been bailed out, would Buiter have gotten this job? Or, as Felix Salmon put it , it may be better to have Buiter “inside the tent pissing out.” Get HuffPost Business On Facebook and Twitter !

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Economist: Why The Bailout Money Should Have Gone To Real People, Not Banks

September 20, 2009

Inside the beltway and among mainstream economists, Larry Summers has the reputation of being a genius. But Australian PhD economist Steve Keen points out a huge gap in the thinking of Summers — and all neoclassical economists.

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Summers:Distress In Commercial Real Estate Market Requires …

September 18, 2009

WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- Larry Summers, one of President Barack Obama’s top economic advisers, said Friday that weakness in the US commercial real – estate market is a real concern that needs to be closely monitored by regulators.

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Summers:Distress In Commercial Real Estate Market Requires …

September 18, 2009

WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- Larry Summers, one of President Barack Obama’s top economic advisers, said Friday that weakness in the US commercial real – estate market is a real concern that needs to be closely monitored by regulators.

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