pension

Ellen Brown: How Wisconsin Can Turn Austerity Into Prosperity: Own a Bank

March 7, 2011

Public sector man sitting in a bar: “They’re trying to take away our pensions.” Private sector man: “What’s a pension?” – Cartoon in the Houston Chronicle As states struggle to meet their budgets, public pensions are on the chopping block, but they needn’t be. States can keep their pension funds intact while leveraging them into many times their worth in loans, just as Wall Street banks do. They can do this by forming their own public banks, following the lead of North Dakota — a state that currently has a budget surplus. Public workers are not going quietly into that good night of state budgets balanced at the expense of union benefits. After three weeks of protests in Wisconsin, convictions remain strong and pressure is building. Fourteen Wisconsin Democratic lawmakers said Friday that they are not deterred by threats of possible arrest and of 1,500 layoffs if they don’t return to work. President Obama has charged Wisconsin’s Governor Scott Walker with attempting to bust the unions. But Walker’s defense is: “We’re broke. Like nearly every state across the country, we don’t have any more money.” Among other concessions, Governor Walker wants to require public employees to pay a portion of the cost of their own pensions. Bemoaning a budget deficit of $3.6 billion , he says the state is too broke to afford all these benefits. Broke Unless You Count the $67 Billion Pension Fund . . . That’s what he says, but according to Wisconsin’s 2010 CAFR (Comprehensive Annual Financial Report), the state has $67 billion in pension and other employee benefit trust funds, invested mainly in stocks and debt securities drawing a modest return. A recent study by the PEW Center for the States showed that Wisconsin’s pension fund is almost fully funded, meaning it can meet its commitments for years to come without drawing on outside sources. It requires a contribution of only $645 million annually to meet pension payouts. Zach Carter, writing in the Huffington Post, notes that the pension program could save another $195 million annually just by cutting out its Wall Street investment managers and managing the funds in-house. The governor is evidently eying the state’s lucrative pension fund, not because the state cannot afford the pension program, but as a source of revenue for programs that are not fully funded. This tactic, however, is not going down well with state employees. Fortunately, there is another alternative. Wisconsin could draw down the fund by the small amount needed to meet pension obligations, and put the bulk of the money to work creating jobs, helping local businesses, and increasing tax revenues for the state. It could do this by forming its own bank, following the lead of North Dakota, the only state to have its own bank — and the only state to escape the credit crisis. This could be done without spending the pension fund money or lending it. The funds would just be shifted from one form of investment to another (equity in a bank). When a bank makes a loan, neither the bank’s own capital nor its customers’ demand deposits are actually lent to borrowers. As observed on the Dallas Federal Reserve’s website , “Banks actually create money when they lend it.” They simply extend accounting-entry bank credit, which is extinguished when the loan is repaid. Creating this sort of credit-money is a privilege available only to banks, but states can tap into that privilege by owning a bank. How North Dakota Escaped the Credit Crunch Ironically, the only state to have one of these socialist-sounding credit machines is a conservative Republican state. The state-owned Bank of North Dakota (BND) has allowed North Dakota to maintain its economic sovereignty, a conservative states-rights sort of ideal. The BND was established in 1919 in response to a wave of farm foreclosures at the hands of out-of-state Wall Street banks. Today the state not only has no debt, but it recently boasted its largest-ever budget surplus . The BND helps to fund not only local government but local businesses and local banks, by partnering with the banks to provide the funds to support small business lending. The BND is also a boon to the state treasury. It has a return on equity of 25-26% , and it has contributed over $300 million to the state (its only shareholder) in the past decade. This is a notable achievement for a state with a population less than one-tenth the size of Los Angeles County. In comparison, California’s public pension funds are down more than $100 billion — that’s billion with a “b” – or a third of the funds’ holdings, following the Wall Street debacle of 2008. It was, in fact, the 2008 bank collapse, not overpaid public employees, that caused the crisis that shrank state revenues and prompted the budget cuts in the first place. Seven States Are Now Considering Setting Up Public Banks Faced with federal inaction and growing local budget crises, an increasing number of states are exploring the possibility of setting up their own state-owned banks, following the North Dakota model. On January 11, 2011, a bill to establish a state-owned bank was introduced in the Oregon State legislature ; on January 13, a similar bill was introduced in Washington State ; on January 20, a bill for a state bank was filed in Massachusetts (following a 2010 bill that had lapsed); and on February 4, a bill was introduced in the Maryland legislature for a feasibility study looking into the possibilities. They join Illinois , Virginia , and Hawaii , which introduced similar bills in 2010, bringing the total number of states with such bills to seven. If Governor Walker wanted to explore this possibility for his state, he could drop in on the Center for State Innovation (CSI), which is located down the street in his capitol city of Madison, Wisconsin. The CSI has done detailed cost/benefit analyses of the Oregon and Washington state bank initiatives, which show substantial projected benefits based on the BND precedent. See reports here and here . For Washington State, with an economy not much larger than Wisconsin’s, the CSI report estimates that after an initial startup period, establishing a state-owned bank would create new or retained jobs of between 7,400 and 10,700 a year at small businesses alone, while at the same time returning a profit to the state. A Bank of Wisconsin Could Generate “Bank Credit” Many Times the Size of the Budget Deficit Economists looking at the CSI reports have called their conclusions conservative. The CSI made its projections without relying on state pension funds for bank capital, although it acknowledged that this could be a potential source of capitalization. If the Bank of Wisconsin were to use state pension funds, it could have a capitalization of more than $57 billion – nearly as large as that of Goldman Sachs . At an 8% capital requirement, $8 in capital can support $100 in loans, or a potential lending capacity of over $500 billion. The bank would need deposits to clear the checks, but the credit-generating potential could still be huge. Banks can create all the bank credit they want, limited only by (a) the availability of creditworthy borrowers, (b) the lending limits imposed by bank capital requirements, and (c) the availability of “liquidity” to clear outgoing checks. Liquidity can be acquired either from the deposits of the bank’s own customers or by borrowing from other banks or the money market. If borrowed, the cost of funds is a factor; but at today’s very low Fed funds rate of 0.2%, that cost is minimal. Again, however, only banks can tap into these very low rates. States are reduced to borrowing at about 5% — unless they own their own banks; or, better yet, unless they are banks. The BND is set up as “North Dakota doing business as the Bank of North Dakota.” That means that technically, all of North Dakota’s assets are the assets of the bank. The BND also has its deposit needs covered. It has a massive, captive deposit base, since all of the state’s revenues are deposited in the bank by law. The bank also takes other deposits, but the bulk of its deposits are government funds. The BND is careful not to compete with local banks for consumer deposits, which account for less than 2% of the total. The BND reports that it has deposits of $2.7 billion and outstanding loans of $2.6 billion. With a population of 647,000, that works out to about $4,000 per capita in deposits, backing roughly the same amount in loans. Wisconsin has a population that is nine times the size of North Dakota’s. Other factors being equal, Wisconsin might be able to amass over $24 billion in deposits and generate an equivalent sum in loans – over six times the deficit complained of by the state’s governor. That lending capacity could be used for many purposes, depending on the will of the legislature and state law. Possibilities include (a) partnering with local banks, on the North Dakota model, strengthening their capital bases to allow credit to flow to small businesses and homeowners, where it is sorely needed today; (b) funding infrastructure virtually interest-free (since the state would own the bank and would get back any interest paid out); and (c) refinancing state deficits nearly interest-free. Why Give Wisconsin’s Enormous Credit-generating Power Away? The budget woes of Wisconsin and other states were caused, not by overspending on employee benefits, but by a credit crisis on Wall Street. The “cure” is to get credit flowing again in the local economy, and this can be done by using state assets to capitalize state-owned banks. Against the modest cost of establishing a publicly-owned bank, state legislators need to weigh the much greater costs of the alternatives – slashing essential public services, laying off workers, raising taxes on constituents who are already over-taxed, and selling off public assets. Given the cost of continuing business as usual, states can hardly afford not to consider the public bank option. When state and local governments invest their capital in out-of-state money center banks and deposit their revenues there, they are giving their enormous credit-generating power away to Wall Street.

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William S. Lerach: Blame Wall Street, Not Hard Working Americans, for the Pension Funds Fiasco

February 26, 2011

The confrontations in Wisconsin and other states are the opening salvo of a political blame game — who is responsible for the gigantic public pension fund deficits that threaten states’ solvency and workers’ retirement savings? The conservative spin machine blames public employees, claiming their greedy unions extorted extravagant and now unaffordable benefits which justify pension cutbacks and union-busting. This is a false. The real cause of the pension fund debacle is the greed of Wall Street and its corporate allies. It’s a result of their dismantling of our nation’s regulatory safeguards and Wall Street’s capture and abuse of America’s public pension funds — charging them huge management fees, while losing trillions of dollars of pension fund assets in risky investments. Wall Street developed with no regulation. Abuses abounded. Financial markets were corrupt. Then came the 1929 Crash, a wealth destruction event that ended the dreams of an American generation. The Pecora hearings exposed self-dealing and fraud by Wall Street bankers. Wall Street faced ruin. But instead of wiping out Wall Street or nationalizing the banks, we chose to save capitalism and protect investors — by creating a new system of highly regulated financial markets. Congress created the SEC to oversee stock exchanges, require honest accounting and disclosure by corporations and broke up (and strictly controlled) the Wall Street banks. In time, this new regulatory framework created the greatest age of economic growth and prosperity in history. Despite periodic recessions and bear markets — there were no more investor wealth destruction events. As the U.S. became the world’s financial powerhouse, no one got more powerful than the Wall Street banks and their corporate allies. Then they set about undoing the very regulatory framework that had saved them. As politics came to depend on massive infusions of cash, no one provided more of it than corporations and Wall Street banks. They complained that regulation was restricting American competitiveness and economic growth — our citizenry was seduced by promises of greater growth and prosperity. Government, which had actually been the key to the solution, became portrayed as the problem. They captured Congress. And then came the regulatory teardown. Congress deregulated the S&Ls. Then it enacted severe cut backs on investor protections and curtailed their right to sue. Glass-Steagall was repealed — allowing the long forbidden financial giants — investment and commercial banks — to recombine. The Wall Street/ Corporate alliance used its power to see that regulatory agencies passed into the hands of appointees who were hostile to the regulations they were supposed to enforce. Investor protection rules were diluted. A pro-corporate Supreme Court curtailed suits against banks and corporations. The result was behemoth banks, less regulatory oversight and less accountability. So, what came from this era of de-regulation? Increased competitiveness, economic growth, wealth and prosperity? No — instead we got repeated waves of financial fraud and wealth destruction events. First came the S&L blowup of the mid-1980s. Over 3,000 S&Ls collapsed. A few years later it was the 2000-2001 dot.com/telecommunications meltdowns epitomized by WorldCom and Enron. Most recently, our major financial institutions were rocked by scandal — the worst crash since 1929. Investors lost over $20 trillion in these three massive wealth destruction events, which were the result of the teardown of the regulatory framework that had been erected over the prior 70 years to control our financial markets and protect investors. America’s public pension plans — guardians of the life savings of countless working people — were the biggest victims of these wealth destruction events. A pension system is a bet on the future — some money is set aside currently, but not enough to pay all the promised benefits. So, how pension funds are invested and safeguarded is key. Originally, many states required pension funds to invest in safe, interest-bearing bonds. But Wall Street could not make a lot of money from that, so it bank-rolled initiatives and legislation to repeal these protections and permit pension funds to be invested in the stuff they make big profits by peddling. Then Wall Street money managers captured pension funds’ investment portfolios by assuring trustees that ever-higher stock prices would pay for the retirement promises. Charging enormous fees, they made risky stock market bets, putting up to 80% of pension plan assets in the stock market. The Wall Street wisdom that ever-rising stock prices would fund pension plan promises was wrong. In fact, we have seen three major equity wealth destruction events in last 20 years. As a result, the financial situation of our public employee pension funds is precarious. These funds lost hundreds of billions in the S&L disaster and the 2001-2002 market crash. After the 2001-2002 wipeout — guided by Wall Street — fund trustees took much greater risks to try to make up for the prior losses. They poured billions into hedge funds, private equity, speculative real estate and that special Wall Street invention — collateralized debt obligations. Then, in the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the losses of public funds were stupendous. 109 state funds lost $865 billion in about one year. CalPERS lost $72 billion! Now virtually all of these funds are now grossly under-funded. New Jersey and Illinois are each over $50 billion underwater . Why are our public pension systems and plans in such precarious financial condition? Of course there are some examples of excessive pensions, of double-dipping and of “gaming” the system to “goose” the pension amount. But these are few in number. And, even in the aggregate, the financial impact of these excesses pale in comparison to the gigantic investment losses of these pension funds. So let’s place the fault where it really belongs — not with working people — but with Wall Street banks. Who made money on these risky investment gambles? Who takes pension fund trustees to play golf and on so-called “educational” junkets at lush resorts to enjoy lavish dinners? Wall Street. The inappropriate investments that caused these massive pension fund losses were not an accident. The pension fund field caught the Wall Street contagion — financial corruption. It’s called “Pay to Play.” The SEC saw it years ago but, controlled by anti-regulation political appointees, it did nothing. So a nationwide system of political contributions to elected officials who sit on fund boards and payoffs and kickbacks to politically well-connected “Placement Agents” to steer fund money to Wall Street became widespread. Not surprisingly, the investments obtained by “pay-to-play” kickbacks and contributions have generated horrific losses. An investment officer of the California Public Employee Pension Fund was forced to resign — he got an all-expense-paid trip to NYC from an investment group that got $600 million from the fund. The middle men on that deal — two former top CalPERs officials — got some $20 million to arrange this placement. Two other former CalPERS officials have been sued by the Attorney General for taking $50 million in placement fees to steer pension investments. CalPERs lost hundreds of millions on such investments. Alan Hevesi — the former head of the New York State Fund — pleaded guilty to doling out billions in that Fund’s assets to favored managers in return for benefits. The SEC has finally outlawed this system of bribes and kickbacks. But too late — the damage has already been done to the pension funds. Nationwide, public pension funds lost billions on these types of corrupt investments with Wall Street types. The horrible deficit numbers funds admit to actually hide a far more terrible reality. To determine how well a fund is “funded” it uses an assumed rate of return. It estimates how much the fund will earn on its investment portfolio in the future. For decades, public pension funds have assumed 7.5%-8%, even 9% annual growth, i.e., over 100% compounded over 10 years. Fat chance! Today, pension funds are engaged in massive deceptions to conceal the true extent of their funding deficits. They are concealing the massive black holes that haunt public budgets. These ridiculous 7.5%-9.0% assumed rates of return are not “little white lies” — they are Everest-sized whoppers. If the three big California Public Funds used a 4.5%-5% rate of return instead of the 7.5%-8% they now use, these funds would be $500 billion under-funded — 10 times the $50 billion shortfall they admit to. Since this is a nationwide deception going on in virtually all public plans, try extrapolating that out. Public employee funds are probably $3 or $4 trillion underwater. The massive shortfalls we now face exist despite prior “Bull Markets” and the current rally. And the next round of excess of a still under-regulated Wall Street will produce another wealth destruction event that will erase recent gains. This is no academic matter. The time to keep the retirement promises is now upon us. In the next several years, some 77 million U.S. baby boomers — including millions of teachers and public service workers — will enter retirement. Unfortunately, the U.S. public pension system has become a fraud-infested house of cards. Wisconsin shows us this house of cards is starting to collapse, sparking a major political battle. The conservatives will “scapegoat” public employees as a privileged — protected — class. But it was not firemen, cops, clerks, or teachers (or their unions) who lost trillions of dollars in risky investments in an under-regulated stock market over the past 20 years. The Wall Street money managers lost it in investments acquiesced in by the pension fund trustees they had wined and dined. It’s the same old story. The bankers pocket gigantic fees. The privileged few get fat. Ordinary people get run over. And now are even to be blamed — even punished — for a mess they did not create. We cannot allow these public pension plans to collapse. Nor can we break our promises to workers who relied in good faith on promised pensions. Fortunately, there is a solution that could help protect retirees and at the same time help finance our huge federal deficit — if we act fast. First — stop allowing Wall Street money managers to speculate with workers’ retirement savings in risky equities and other crazy investments. Second — create a new 7% or 8% inflation-indexed U.S. Treasury bond only for retirement funds, in staggered 10-30 year maturities. Require all pension plans to buy and hold these bonds. To allow an orderly transition — require that over the next seven years — 80%-90% of all pension plan assets must be put in these safe, high-yield bonds. These bonds will provide low-cost returns for pension funds. This will stop Wall Street’s gouging the funds with huge fees and speculating with workers’ retirement savings. This solution will also help finance our huge federal deficit. While the interest rate is high — we taxpayers are going to end up paying to solve this problem one way or the other. And, at least this way, the interest payments will go to support our fellow retired citizens — not the Chinese. It’s a simple, elegant solution — but Wall Street and the politicians they control will never permit it. William S. Lerach, is a national lecturer, writer and investor advocate. As a practicing attorney, he recovered $45 billion for investors, including $7.2 billion for the victims of the Enron fraud.

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Video: Liu Calls for Independent Audit of Foreclosure Practices

November 16, 2010

Nov. 16 (Bloomberg) — New York City Comptroller John Liu discusses his request, on behalf of the city’s Pension Funds, to directors at Bank of America Corp., Wells Fargo & Co., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. to conduct independent audits of their banks’ mortgage and foreclosure practices. Liu speaks with Carol Massar on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop With Betty Liu.” (Source: Bloomberg)

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Rick Lazio: Wall Street’s Subprime Candidate

August 19, 2010

Within Hours of George Bush’s May 3, 2007, announcement that he was naming Charles Millard head of the $64 billion Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), Rick Lazio got an e-mail about it from a fellow JPMorgan Chase executive.

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NJ Settles SEC Fraud Charges Over Muni Bond Sales

August 18, 2010

WASHINGTON — The state of New Jersey has settled federal civil fraud charges of failing to inform bond investors that it had not met obligations to its largest pension plans, federal regulators said Wednesday. In announcing the settlement, the Securities and Exchange Commission said New Jersey did not give municipal bond investors enough information to fully assess the state’s financial picture. New Jersey was the first state ever charged for violations of the securities laws. New Jersey neither admitted nor denied the allegations. It did agree to refrain from future violations of the securities laws. Many states around the country have been unable to fully fund their public employee pension plans in the financial crisis. “It is an area of concern,” Elaine Greenberg, chief of the SEC’s municipal securities and public pensions unit, said in a telephone interview. “We want to make sure that states and municipalities are adequately disclosing” their pension fund liabilities, she said. In a news release, the New Jersey attorney general’s office and the Treasury Department said state officials cooperated with the inquiry. The state noted in the release that it responded to the situation by hiring outside lawyers in 2007 to advise the state on disclosure obligations and adopting new formal disclosure procedures. No financial penalty was levied against the state. The SEC said it took into account state authorities’ cooperation in its investigation and the action taken by the state to correct the situation. New Jersey sold more than $26 billion in municipal bonds between 2001 and 2007 to raise money for economic development projects, such as roads and power lines, the SEC said. But the bond sale documents didn’t disclose that the state had failed to meet its financial obligations to two state employee pension funds. New Jersey likely couldn’t contribute to the pension funds without raising taxes or cutting services, the SEC said. As a result, investors in New Jersey’s bonds lacked sufficient information to assess the state’s financial status, the SEC said. “All issuers of municipal securities, including states, are obligated to provide investors with the information necessary to evaluate material risks,” Robert Khuzami, the SEC’s enforcement director, said in a statement. Since the start of the SEC’s inquiry in April 2007, no rating agencies have downgraded New Jersey’s credit rating “and the state has continued to make all required debt-service payments on the bonds,” the state said in its release. A spokesman for the state Treasury Department said repayment of bonds was never at risk. “The state of New Jersey has never failed to pay its bondholders,” said the spokesman, Andy Pratt. The nation’s $2.7 trillion muni bond market is used to finance schools, roads and hospitals around the country. Retail investors increasingly participate in the market, seeking safe investments with reliable returns. The SEC last year proposed requiring brokers in municipal bonds to make fuller and more timely disclosures to investors. Also last year, the agency reached a settlement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. in which the Wall Street bank agreed to pay $75 million in civil fines and forfeit $647 million in fees to resolve charges that it made unlawful payments to friends of public officials to win municipal bond business in Alabama.

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